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Are workers compensated by cheaper housing  
in regions where unemployment is high? 
Theory and evidence from a housing demand survey 
 
 
Abstract:  The  empirical  wage  curve  literature  has  demonstrated  that  workers  in  high-
unemployment  regions  earn  less.  At  the  same  time,  many  labour  markets,  especially  in 
Europe,  are  characterised  by  persistent  regional  unemployment  differentials  and  a  low 
interregional  labour  mobility  rate.  It  is  argued  in  this  paper  that  workers  in  high-
unemployment regions are compensated in the housing market, which discourages migration 
to low-unemployment regions. We derive a multiregional efficiency wage model allowing for 
endogenous land prices, and therefore house prices, as well as endogenous lot sizes. It is 
shown that in high-unemployment regions, land prices are lower and lot sizes are larger. 
Therefore, aggregate regional house price data misrepresent the compensating differential. 
Employing a Dutch housing demand survey, we show that attribute corrected house prices 
and rents are 10.4 respectively 2.4 percent lower when regional unemployment is one percent 
higher. 
 
Keywords: regional unemployment, compensating differentials, efficiency wages, housing 
markets, land markets, hedonic price equations 
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I  Introduction 
 
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  an  increased  interest  in  the  interaction  between  regional 
housing and labour markets. A (mainly British) literature has built up that investigates the role 
of housing markets in discouraging labour migration. A first channel of interaction, according 
to this literature, is that labour migrants are hampered in finding suitable residences because 
of housing markets institutions.
1 Secondly, it is argued that cost-of-living differentials, and 
house  price  differentials  in  particular,  discourage  migration  to  low-unemployment  regions 
(Bover  et  al.,  1989).  Econometric  evidence  in  support  of  the  latter  hypothesis  has  been 
provided by Jackman and Savouri (1992) and Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) employing 
aggregate data. 
  Our present paper expands on the notion that regional house price differentials relate 
to  unemployment.  We  argue,  and  verify  empirically,  that  workers  in  high-unemployment 
regions are compensated through the housing market. It has been shown by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994) that, contrary to the predictions of the Harris-Todaro model (1970), workers in 
these  regions  appear  not  to  be  compensated  through  wages.  Nevertheless,  regional 
unemployment differentials tend to persist, especially in European labour markets (OECD, 
1989, 1990, 2000, Decressin and Fatas, 1995).
2 Our hypothesis that compensation does not 
occur through wages but through house prices may to some extent reconcile these conflicting 
observations. 
In  the  theoretical  part  of  this  paper,  we  extend  an  efficiency  wage  model  from 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) with endogenous land prices. It is shown that land prices are 
lower in high-unemployment regions, so workers are compensated in the land market. We 
also consider housing attributes, distinguishing size and quality attributes. This distinction is 
relevant, because the price of size attributes is region-specific, whereas the price of quality 
attributes is not. It is derived that in regions where land prices are higher, households tend to 
buy  less  size  attributes.  This  implies  that  workers  in  high-unemployment  regions  live  in 
houses  that  are  cheaper  and  larger.  Aggregate  regional  house  price  data  may  therefore 
underestimate the compensating differential. 
                                                 
1 More specifically, Hughes and McCormick (1987) argue that the private rental sector in the U.K. has been 
squeezed  between  the  tax-benefited  owner-occupier  sector  and  a  highly  regulated  “council  housing”  sector, 
causing scarcity of short-term housing for migrants (cf. Minford et al, 1987, McCormick, 1997). 
2  A  common  explanation  for  rigidity  of  European  labour  markets  is  their  relatively  generous  institutions 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986, Layard et al., 1991, Nickell, 1997). However, such an explanation may be more 
satisfactory on the national than on the regional level.    4 
Using  data  from  a  Dutch  housing  demand  survey,  we  account  for  the  systematic 
regional variation in housing attributes in an empirical analysis of compensating house price 
differentials. The survey includes both size attributes (e.g. a garden) and quality attributes 
(e.g. double-glazing). Our method is to regress house prices on these attributes and on 40 
region dummies. Coefficients of the region dummies are interpreted as regional house price 
differentials that can not be explained by housing attributes. Comparing these corrected house 
price  differentials  with  regional  unemployment  differentials,  we  establish  a  negative 
relationship. 
For estimation of the house price equations, we distinguish an owner-occupier and a 
rental sector. Regulation on the latter market is substantial, so that regional rent differentials 
are expected to be relatively small. In addition, the data include the employment status of the 
households’ breadwinner. This allows us to verify, for a limited number of regions, to what 
extent  price  and  housing  attribute  differentials  accrue  to  the  unemployed  or  to  other 
individuals. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we extend an efficiency 
wage model, which establishes a negative relationship between regional unemployment and 
house  prices.  In  Section  3,  we  discuss  hedonic  price  equations  used  to  obtain  attribute-
corrected prices and  we introduce the data. Section 4 relates house price differentials for 
Dutch  regions  to  regional  unemployment  rates.  We  conclude  in  Section  5,  and  discuss 
directions for future research.  
 
II  An efficiency wage model with endogenous land prices 
 
This  section  derives  a  negative  relationship  between  regional  unemployment  and  house 
prices. We extend an efficiency wage model proposed in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 
section  3.2),  henceforth  referred  to  as  BO.  In  their  model,  a  high  level  of  regional 
unemployment is associated with a low level of wages. Employees in a high-unemployment 
region are keen to keep their job, because it will be difficult to find another. Therefore, firms 
need to pay lower wages to extract the required level of effort from workers. It is assumed 
that migration is costly, so that individuals migrate only if one region offers a better expected 
utility than another.  In  equilibrium, wage and  unemployment differences between regions 
must therefore be compensated by, for example, non-pecuniary amenity differentials.  
   5 
In our extension, wage and unemployment differences are not compensated by exogenous 
amenity differentials, but by endogenous land price differentials.
3 We assume that workers 
buy a piece of land in the region where they work and on this land they put their house. There 
is  no  interregional  commuting.  Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the  price  of  land  depends 
positively on the number of inhabitants in a region. This assumption can be justified in several 
ways. The amount of inhabitable land in a region is fixed, at least in the short run. When more 
people bid for a fixed supply of some good, its price will go up under very mild conditions. 
According to the urban economics literature, the positive relationship between land prices and 
the size of the population holds even when the supply of inhabitable land is perfectly elastic. 
The basic assumption in that literature is that within a regional labour market, employees 
work at the same location, a central business district, which is surrounded by a residential 
area.  The  average  commuting  costs  increase  when  the  size  of  the  working  population 
increases, which is reflected in land prices in turn.
4  
 
The basic model  
In  the  most  elementary  model,  we  assume  that  lot  sizes  in  all  regions  are  constant  and 
normalised to unity. Extensions to this model will be discussed further in this section. 
We consider two regions that each produce distinct goods under constant returns to 
scale for perfectly competitive international markets (cf. BO, p. 81). Hence, the prices of these 
goods are exogenously determined. It is assumed that the price for one good is higher than for 
the other, so that wages differ between regions.
5 We will presume that the wage in region 1 
exceeds the wage in region 2. 
Workers are free to choose a region of residence and they are assumed to choose the 
region that renders the highest expected utility during a period.
6 During this period they may 
                                                 
3 In their basic model, regional differences in exogenous non-pecuniary amenities play an essential role, whereas 
regional differences endogenously in land prices do not receive any explicit attention in the theoretical analysis. 
Given  the  assumption  of  endogenously  determined  land  prices,  it  can  be  easily  seen  that  the  role  of  non-
pecuniary amenities disappears, because land prices fully compensate for differences in amenities.  
4 A general result in this type of model is that the total value of occupied land in the economy is equal to the total 
value of commuting costs in the economy (Fujita, 1989). The intuitive explanation for this result is that workers 
choose  a  residential  location  and  pay  an  endogenously  determined  land  price  such  that  in  equilibrium  all 
employees  with  higher  commuting  costs  are  compensated  for  these  commuting  costs  by  lower  land  prices 
(relative to the employee with zero commuting costs). 
5 This assumption may be justified by heterogeneity in regional endowments, like differences in accessibility to 
international markets, or by economies of agglomeration for example. It is not material to our results.  
6 This assumption can be phrased by assuming that workers have to choose the region at the beginning of the 
period, but are not allowed to move during the period.   6 
be employed or unemployed, the probabilities being known to them in advance.
7 The utility of 
an employed worker equals w – e + η(S) - HS, where w denotes the wage and e denotes work 
effort, η denotes the utility enjoyed of a house. The lot size of the house is equal to S. Land 
prices are denoted as H. It is assumed that e is either a fixed positive number determined by 
technology, or zero. In the latter case, the worker shirks. When shirking, the workers may be 
fired  with  probability  1  –  δ.  In  equilibrium  there  is  no  shirking.  The  utility  enjoyed  by 
unemployed workers equals b + η(S) - HS, where b denotes the exogenous unemployment 
benefit. The probability of finding work α(u) depends negatively on the unemployment rate u 
in a convex way. 
The  labour  markets  of  both  regions  are  identical  apart  from  the  exogenous  wage 
differences. Land prices are endogenous. For simplicity, we will assume that the height of the 
building  (the  capital  intensity  per  square  kilometre)  is  constant,  so  land  prices  can  be 
interpreted  as  house  prices.  Initially  we  assume  that  residence  lot  size  S  is  constant  and 
standardised  to  1,  so  lot  sizes  are  fixed  and  land  prices  can  be  interpreted  as  housing 
expenditure.  For  convenience,  we  suppose  that  η(1)  =  0.  Given  these  assumptions,  a  no 
shirking condition derives to the following equation for both regions (cf. BO, p. 67): 
 







+ + = , i = 1, 2              (1)   
 
It can be shown that u > 0, so there exists involuntary unemployment in equilibrium 
(proposition 2.2). Equation (1) establishes a negative relationship between regional wages and 
unemployment, the wage curve. The intuitive explanation behind it is that wages in each 
region must be just enough to dissuade employees from shirking. Hence, wages are set by 
employers to compensate employed workers for the sum of the effort and the unemployment 
benefit and pay also a mark-up to prevent workers from shirking.
8  
Because  employed  workers  compare  their  utility  to  the  utility  enjoyed  when  they 
would  be  unemployed,  the  non-shirking  condition  does  not  depend  on  any  regional 
characteristic that affects the utility in a linear way.
9 Hence, because by assumption, within a 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, it can be assumed that the regions experience random shocks. Workers experience spells of 
employment and unemployment as a result (cf. BO, p. 67).  
8 In our model, regional wages are fixed. This means that equilibrium unemployment in each region must be just 
high enough to discourage workers from shirking.  
9 Suppose however, that there would be decreasing marginal utility of income. Real regional benefit differentials 
would then enter nonlinearly, and they would affect the level of regional unemployment.    7 
region, land prices are identical for the employed and unemployed, the non-shirking condition 
is independent of the land price H.  
Let L denotes the working population in a region, H = h(L), where we assume that  
h’(L) > 0.  For convenience, we normalise the land price in region 2 to one, H2 = 1. In 
equilibrium, migration between regions is zero by assumption. Equilibrium requires then that 
the expected utility is identical in both regions. This implies (cf. BO, p. 81): 
 
)] ( 1 ][ 1 [ ) ( ] 1 [ )] ( 1 ][ [ ) ( ] [ 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 u b u e w u H b u H e w a a a a - - + - - = - - + - -     (2) 
 
The above equation has a straightforward interpretation. For example the employed 
utility in region 1 is equal to w1 – e1 – H1, whereas the unemployed utility is equal to b – H1. 
So, the expected utility in regions is determined by the probability of finding work α(u1). 
From this equation we can solve H1. Since by assumption w1 > w2, we have from equation (1) 
that u1 < u2. It follows that H1 > 1.
10 Higher wages and lower unemployment in region 1 will 
attract migrants as long as H1 is below its equilibrium value, but the population increase will 
raise land prices. In equilibrium, the superior labour market perspectives in this region will be 
exactly  counterbalanced  by  higher  land  prices.  Furthermore,  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
equilibrium land price in region 1 is negatively related to the local unemployment rate.
11 We 
conclude  that  in  a  region  where  unemployment  is  high  and  wages  are  low,  workers  are 
compensated through land markets. Following BO’s proposition 2.7 (p. 74), the above result 
can be generalised to a multi-regional economy.  
 
Endogenous lot size 
It  is  straightforward  to  extend  the  basic  model  with  endogenous  lot  sizes.  Relaxing  our 
assumptions about fixed lot sizes, the no migration condition reads: 
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10 Proof: From equation (2) we derive  )] ( ) ( ][ [ ) ( ) ( 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 u u b e u w u w H a a a a - + - - + = . We have w1 > w2, 
u1 < u2 and therefore α(u1) > α(u2). In addition, it must hold that wi – e > b (from equation 1). Therefore,  
[e + b][α(u1) - α(u2)] < w2[α(u1) - α(u2)] < w1α(u1) - w2α(u2). It follows that H1 > 1. (Note that the inequality 
would  also  hold  when  w1  =  w2,  so  formally,  we  only  need  a  nonnegative  relationship  between  regional 
unemployment and wages.)   8 
 
  Now suppose that utility depends on lot size in a concave way,  0 ) ( " ; 0 ) ( ' < > S S h h . 
Households maximise  HS S - ) ( h over S, so for both regions it holds that  i i H S = ) ( ' h  . Land 
prices are determined by these conditions and equation (3). It can be shown that  2 1 H H >  and 
2 1 S S < .
12 This means that in a region where unemployment is high and wages are low, land 
is cheaper and workers have larger lot sizes. Again, this result generalises to an arbitrary 
number of regions. 
The result that households buy larger lot sizes in regions where land is cheaper is 
hardly surprising, but it is important for the evaluation of compensation through land markets. 
In our model, the regional house price equals HiSi. Apriori, this price can be lower as well as 
higher  in  high-  unemployment  regions,  simply  because  workers  may  buy  more  land. 
Therefore,  an  analysis  of  aggregate  regional  house  prices  that  ignores  lot  sizes  may 
underestimate the compensating differential. For this reason, we use a housing demand survey 
to correct for attributes related to the size of houses in the empirical part of our paper.  
 
III  Estimation of attribute-corrected regional house prices 
 
Housing is a heterogeneous good that varies in size, age, building quality and numerous other 
attributes. These attributes are reflected in the house price. We have seen in the previous 
section  that  ignoring  the  variation  in  lot  sizes  may  lead  to  underestimation  of  regional 
compensation  through  housing  markets.  In  this  section  we  use  microdata  that  distinguish 
numerous attributes, to deal with heterogeneity of the regional housing stock.  
We divide the observed housing attributes into size attributes (position of the house, 
availability of garden, number of rooms etc.) and quality attributes (central heating, double 
glazing etc.). There will be a regional component to the price of size attributes, if land markets 
compensate for regional labour market perspectives. There is no obvious reason why there 
would be regional variation in the price of quality attributes. It may therefore be expected that 
                                                                                                                                                          
11 Proof: We simply differentiate the expression for H1 to u1, bearing in mind that w1 is a function of u1. This 
yields:  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 / ) ( ] ) ( [ / ) ( ) ( / u u b e u w u u w u w H ¶ ¶ - - + ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ a a . The derivatives of w1 and α with respect to 
u1  are negative. Recalling that wi – e > b and α > 0, it follows that  0 / 1 1 < ¶ ¶ w H . 
12  Proof:  Again,  we  have  that  in  equilibrium,  the  superior  labour  market  perspectives  in  region  1  must  be 
compensated through the land market. Therefore, it must hold that  ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 1 1 1 S H S S H S - < - h h . We substitute 
i i H S = ) ( ' h  and write  ( ) ( ) ( )S S S S f ' h h - = . The inequality  ( ) ( ) 2 1 S f S f <  implies that  2 1 S S <  if the function f   9 
people  in  high-unemployment  regions  consume  more  size  attributes,  and  people  in  low-
unemployment regions consume more quality attributes.  
We  regress  house  prices  on  a  number  of  observed  housing  attributes  and  region 
dummies,  estimation  of  hedonic  price  equations  being  a  standard  approach  to  deal  with 
attribute heterogeneity. The dummies are interpreted as the regional price differential that 
cannot be explained by observed attributes.
13 
For the estimation of this hedonic price equation, we distinguish between renters and 
owners.
14 This is relevant, because the level of the rent in the Dutch rental market is regulated 
at the national level, effecting virtually all houses (more than 90%) in the rental market. 
Essentially, the rent of a house is determined by governmental rules, which determine the 
maximum rent (and the maximum change in the rent each year). The maximum rent depends 
on housing attributes (and some local environmental characteristics), but not on the regional 
labour market region. Hence, the regional variation in rents is less than in house prices due to 
exogenous regulation. 










R D X rent e b + + = log                  (5) 
 
Equation (4) presents a model for the logarithm of house prices in the owner-occupier 
sector. This variable is regressed on a number of observable attributes X and region dummies 
O
r D ,  where  subscript  r  denotes  region.  The  superscript  O  indicates  that  coefficients  and 
region  dummies  are  specific  to  this  sector.
15  The  dummy
O
r D is  the  regional  house  price, 
controlled for size and quality attributes. Similarly, coefficients in the rent equation (5) have 
                                                                                                                                                          
is monotonously increasing. Indeed, we derive  ( ) ( )S S S f ' ' ' h - = , which is positive since  0 ) ( " < S h . Now that 
we have shown that  2 1 S S < , it follows that  2 1 H H >  from the conditions  i i H S = ) ( ' h  and  0 ) ( " < S h . 
13 These attributes-controlled  price differentials reflect regional differences in amenities as  well as regional 
differences in labour market perspectives. In the current paper, we are interested to relate these price differences 
directly  to  unemployment  differences.  Differences  in  exogenous  amenities  may  also  cause  differences  in 
unemployment. 
14 This distinction is necessary, because a rent cannot be directly compared to a house price. An additional 
advantage of such a distinction is that a different valuation of attributes for renters and owners is allowed for. 
15 The coefficient  O
i b  is the percentage increase in house price due to a unit increase of attribute Xi.   10 
superscript R and the dummy 
R
r D  is the regional rent, controlled for attributes. Note that the 
same set of observable characteristics is used in both equations.
16  
Both hedonic price equations are estimated on the 1998 Dutch housing demand survey 
(WBO 1998).
17 It contains information on a host of housing attributes, as well as the labour 
market status of the members of the households. Therefore we can distinguish between the 
unemployed  and  the  employed.  Observations  are  weighted,  where  the  weights  have  been 
supplied by the Statistics Netherlands to make the sample representative (some groups have 
been oversampled on purpose). As dependent variables we use logarithms of the self-reported 
value  of  the  house  price  and  the  basic  rent.
18  We  include  40  regional  labour  market 
dummies.
19 
Equation (4) and (5) have been estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Table 3 
in the appendix provides estimation results. House attributes appear statistically significant 
and with expected sign in both equations.
20 It turns out that size attributes have a particularly 
strong effect on both house prices and rents. The type of dwelling dummies (freestanding 
houses, semi-detached houses etc.) have the largest impact by far.
21 In the owner-occupier 
sector, prices for houses are about 25 percent higher than apartments. Freestanding houses are 
on average 50 percent more expensive than apartments. In the rental sector, rents for houses 
are about ten percent higher than for apartments.
22  
The overall impression is that rental differentials related to observed housing attributes 
are set in line with owner-occupier house price differentials, suggesting that governmental 
rules regarding the monetary value of housing attributes are set in line with a non-regulated 
market. Similarly, the region dummy coefficients for the two sectors are strongly correlated. 
However, the regional variation in house prices appears to be much larger than the variation 
                                                 
16  Note  further  that  we  do  not  include  any  information  on  household  characteristics,  such  as  number  of 
inhabitants, children or household income. So, strictly speaking, we do not estimate a hedonic price equation 
(which captures demand and supply), but a price equation which controls for housing attributes and region. 
17 This survey has been held once in the four year since the seventies, with an average sample of about 100,000 
households. 
18 The self-reported house price provides a reliable estimate of the real value of the house (DiPasquale and 
Somerville (1995) and Goodman and Ittner (1992)). The housing demand survey contains several measures for 
the rent. We employ the ‘basic rent’, which excludes expenses on heating etc. 
19  These  regions  have  been  defined  such  that  they  largely  reflect  self-contained  labour  markets.  The  large 
majority of workers (about 70% in 1998) lives and works in the same region. 
20 The year of construction dummies indicate that houses built just after the second world war are worth less that 
those built before or after (probably reflecting poor quality of construction during that period), but in general the 
more  recently  constructed  houses  are  the  most  valuable.  Rents  seem  to  be  more  sensitive  to  the  period  of 
construction than prices in the owner-occupier sector. 
21 Unfortunately, our data do not observe the actual size of dwelling, or of the lot. Therefore, we consider space 
attributes that proxy lot size.    11 
in rents (the standard deviation is three times higher). Arguably, regulation prevents rents 
from fully capturing regional differences in labour market perspectives and amenities.  
 
IV  Regional unemployment and house price differentials 
 
In order to establish a negative relationship between regional unemployment and house prices, 
we compare the 40 region dummy coefficients for the two sectors with unemployment rates. 
Before doing that, however, we analyse house price and unemployment differentials for only 
four Dutch regions. The first reason to do so is that this allows us to explore the regional 
differentiation of space and quality attributes without getting lost in the data. Moreover, the 
housing demand survey observes labour market status. We want to verify to what extent the 
house price differentials accrue to the unemployed.
23 The small number of unemployed that 
























Figure 1: 1989 – 2003 quarterly unemployment rates for four regions, 




                                                                                                                                                          
22 We excluded freestanding houses in the rental sector analysis, because freestanding houses are very rare in this 
sector. 
23 It may be that the people benefiting from large and cheap dwellings are not the same as the workers that face a 
large risk of unemployment. Or alternatively, in large cities average house prices are usually high, but prices (or   12 
Analysis of four regions 
Figure  1  introduces  the  four  regions  in  the  Netherlands  that  we  study,  by  presenting 
unemployment  rate  time  series  between  1989  and  2003.  This  figure  demonstrates  the 
persistence of regional unemployment differentials. Whereas unemployment rates in the East,  
West and South were at a similar level for the fourteen years we observe, the unemployment 
rate in the North has been consistently higher.
24 Therefore, we expect that house prices in this 
region are lower. Furthermore, it is useful to bare in mind that the West, containing the four 
largest cities in the Netherlands, is the most densely populated region.  
We proceed by evaluating the regional variation in size and quality housing attributes, 
shown in Table 4 in the appendix. It appears that dwellings in the West have the least space 
attributes, and dwelling in the North has the most. Notably, the share of freestanding houses is 
almost three times as high in the North as it is in the West. Households in the West appear to 
compensate the smaller size of their house with buying more quality attributes. For example, 
the share of houses with central heating or double-glazing is clearly highest in this region.  
 
Table 1: Regional house price and rent differences. 
Regional price differentials  Owner-occupier  Rental 
    Corrected    Corrected 
North  -0.262  -0.380  -0.143  -0.109 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
East  -0.007  -0.106  -0.049  -0.064 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
South  -0.009  -0.129  -0.031  -0.058 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Note: Standard errors between brackets. West is the reference region; the second and fourth columns correct for 
housing attributes. 
 
Table 1 shows regional house price and rent differentials based on the full sample of 
households.  The  first  and  third  columns  show  uncorrected  house  prices.  The  second  and 
fourth  columns  show  attribute-corrected  house  prices,  which  are,  in  essence,  estimated 
                                                                                                                                                          
rents) in certain high-unemployment districts may be very low. By distinguishing the unemployed, we account 
for these potential aggregation biases.  
24 A wage curve would imply that wages here were lower, but wages in the Netherlands are bargained on the 
national level, so that this may not be the case. However, for our model it is a sufficient condition that the 
relationship between regional unemployment and wages is nonpositive, so that there is no compensation through 
wages. This latter assumption is likely to hold.    13 
dummy coefficients, based on equations (4) and (5).
25 The West is the reference region in this 
table.  
Let us focus first on the owner-occupier sector. The coefficients in the first column of 
Table 1 indicate that people pay less for their house in the North of the country than in other 
regions: about 26 percent on average. When we control for housing attributes the difference 
between the North and the West increases with another 12 percent. In line with theory, houses 
in the North are not only cheaper than in the West, but they also have more attractive size 
attributes on average. Correcting for housing  attributes, it appears that the West is more 
expensive  than  the  East  and  South  regions.  Hence,  houses  in  the  West  have  particularly 
unfavourable attributes compared to the rest of the Netherlands.  
In the rental sector (column 3 and 4 of Table 1), the regional differences appear to be 
considerably smaller than in the owner-occupier sector. Similar to the owner-occupier sector, 
rents in the West are higher than in the other regions, and they are lowest in the North. The 
difference between the West and the North is about 14 percent. However, unlike our findings 
for the owner-occupier sector, the differences in rent are not so sensitive for a correction for 
attributes and regional differences are smaller when we control for attributes. This makes 
sense because the rental market is regulated, so that rent formation has a strong national 
component.
26 After controlling for quality, rent differentials are still statistically significant, 
and rents in the North are about ten percent lower than in the West.  
To  test  to  what  extent  regional  house  price  and  rent  differentials  accrue  to  the 
unemployed in particular, we select households where the breadwinner is unemployed.
27 This 
allows us to verify that it is really the unemployed that have cheaper housing in regions where 
unemployment is high, which does not necessarily hold when average regional house prices 
are  low.  By  regressing  the  residuals  of  equations  (4)  and  (5)  on  a  constant  and  regional 
dummies,  we  estimate  whether  the  attribute-corrected  regional  house  price  and  rent 
differentials  for  the  unemployed  deviate  from  the  other  individuals.  Table  2  shows  the 
corrected and uncorrected regional differentials. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Instead of 40 region dummies, we have included only 4 dummies. The coefficients did not differ significantly 
from the ones discussed in section III.  
26 These results make sense because in the West, houses for rent are of a higher quality. 
27 A person is unemployed when she wants but does not have a job for 12 hours a week or more, and she has 
been engaged in job search during the past month. The breadwinner is the member of the household with the 
highest income. About 14 percent of the households where the breadwinner is unemployed live in an owner-
occupied house. For all households this share is about 54 percent.   14 
Table 2: Regional house price and rent differences of the unemployed. 
Regional price differentials  Owner-occupier  Rental 
    Corrected    Corrected 
North  -0.343  0.098  -0.084  -0.008 
  (0.102)  (0.079)  (0.037)  (0.032) 
East  0.009  0.101  -0.082  -0.064 
  (0.112)  (0.086)  (0.035)  (0.030) 
South  0.120  0.230  -0.037  -0.050 
  (0.108)  (0.084)  (0.037)  (0.032) 
Note: Standard errors between brackets. West is the reference region; the second and fourth columns correct for 
housing attributes. 
 
House prices paid by the unemployed appear to be significantly lower in the North 
than  in  the  rest  of  the  country.  However,  this  difference  (34  percent)  is  not  statistically 
significantly larger than the difference with respect to all households (26 percent). Evaluating 
the second column of Table 2 we see that only the mean residual for the South deviates 
significantly from zero. This means that although corrected house prices are lower in the 
South than in the West (13 percent), this does not hold for the houses owned by unemployed 
households. In other words, the house price differential does not accrue to the unemployed 
here.
28 For the other regions, the attribute corrected house price difference is as large to the 
unemployed as it is to all households.  
Rents paid by unemployed households in the North and East are significantly lower 
than in the West and South. However, the rent differentials are smaller for the unemployed 
than they are for all households. Evaluating the regional differences for the unemployed in the 
residual of equation (2), it appears that attribute corrected rent differentials are slightly larger 
for  the  unemployed  than  they  are  for  all  households.  Only  in  the  East,  this  deviation  is 
statistically significant.  
From  Table  2,  we  may  conclude  that  there  are  some  differences  in  the  attribute-
corrected house price and rent differentials between arbitrary households and households of 
which the breadwinner is unemployed, but these differences appear to be modest. This implies 
that attribute-corrected differentials for arbitrary households give a reasonable estimate of the 
compensation  through  housing  markets  of  the  households  of  which  the  breadwinner  is 
unemployed, or, more generally, households with a large risk of unemployment for one of the   15 
members.
29  We  infer  that  our  estimates  of  the  relationship  between  house  prices  and 
unemployment for 40 regions are not biased because of aggregation to labour market status.  
 
Analysis of 40 regions 
Using the total sample of households, we are able to make a finer regional division of the 
Netherlands.  With  an  increased  number  of  degrees  of  freedom,  the  negative  relationship 
between regional unemployment and house prices is re-established. The figures 2 and 3 show 
scatterplots of attribute-corrected regional house prices and rents to unemployment, where 
Amsterdam (the capital, situated in the West of the country) is the reference region.  
 
 
Figure 2: attribute-corrected regional house prices (in logarithms) to unemployment rates, 
Amsterdam is reference region 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates a strong negative correlation between regional unemployment 
and house prices. A linear fit through these observations yields a coefficient of  -10.4 with a 
standard deviation of 1.8. So, when unemployment is one percent higher, attribute-corrected 
house prices are ten percent lower on average. Ignoring attribute differences, we would have 
found a smaller correlation, with a coefficient of -8.1 and a standard deviation of 1.3. This 
result squares with those for Table 2: correcting for attributes increases regional house price 
differentials.  
                                                                                                                                                          
28 The large free standing houses, which are relatively cheap here, are apparently not bought by people running a 
substantial risk of becoming unemployed. 
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Figure 3: attribute-corrected regional rents (in logarithms) to unemployment rates, 
Amsterdam is reference region 
 
In  the  rental  sector,  there  also  appears  to  be  a  negative  correlation  between  regional 
unemployment  and  attribute-corrected  rents  (figure  3).  A  linear  fit  on  these  observations 
yields that rents are 2.4 percent lower in a region where unemployment is one percent higher 
(the standard deviation is 0.6). As in Table 2, ignoring attribute differentials would lead to a 
somewhat higher correlation (a coefficient of -3.0 with a standard deviation of 0.7). 
 
V  Conclusions 
 
The  central  hypothesis  in  this  paper  is  that  workers  in  high-unemployment  regions  are 
compensated in the housing market. This has been established theoretically by extending a 
regional  efficiency  wage  model  by  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (1994)  with  land  markets. 
Endogenising lot size, it also turned out that workers in high-unemployment regions buy 
larger dwellings. This implies that comparing aggregate regional house prices may lead to 
underestimation of the compensating differential.  
Empirically, it turned out that size and quality attribute corrected house prices are 10.4 
percent lower and rents are 2.4 percent lower when unemployment in a region is one percent 
higher.  In  line  with  theory,  the  compensating  differential  was  underestimated  when  we 
ignored housing attributes in the owner-occupier sector. Our results did not appear to be very 
                                                                                                                                                          
29 This suggests, that self-selection of households that expect the breadwinner to become unemployed is not so 
strong and that households do not move residence when they change between labour market status. 
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sensitive  to  selecting  households  with  an  unemployed  breadwinner.  This  means  that  the 
compensating differentials accrue to the unemployed to the same extent as to other workers.   
The compensating differential is much stronger in the owner-occupier sector than in 
the rental sector. This may be due to regulation in the rental market that does not account for 
differences  in  regional  labour  market  perspectives  or  amenities.  Alternatively,  it  may  be 
argued that compensating differentials need to be much stronger for house-owners, because 
the consequences of becoming unemployment are much graver for them.
30  
In the original model by Blanchflower and Oswald, structural regional differences are 
attributed  to  nonpecuniary  amenities.  How  did  omission  of  these  amenities  affect  our 
conclusions? Suppose that people in regions where wages are low and unemployment is high 
are compensated through amenities. These amenities must have an upward effect on house 
prices and rents. This means that houses in high-unemployment regions are worth even more 
than what we controlled for by means of observed size and quality characteristics. Therefore, 
omitting amenities from our model has lead, if anything, to underestimation of compensation 
through housing markets.  
  Compensation  through  housing  markets  may  be  an  important  finding,  because  the 
mechanism can reconcile two observations that appear to be contradictory. On the one hand, 
extensive  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  people  in  high-unemployment  regions  are  not 
compensated by higher wages (cf. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, Card, 1995, Baltagi and 
Blien, 1998). On the other hand, regional unemployment differentials, especially in Europe, 
are  persistent  and  labour  market  adjustment  through  migration  is  slow  (OECD,  2000). 
Workers  may  be  refrained  from  migration  to  low-unemployment  regions  by  the  larger 
housing costs they would incur. Moreover, low house prices imply a high real benefit level if 
benefits are not adjusted to regional purchasing power. This may reduce the incentive for job 
search in lagging regions.  
  Is this theory consistent with the observation that regional unemployment differentials 
are much more persistent in Europe than in the US? In our model, a positive relationship was 
assumed between land prices and the number of inhabitants in a region. This relationship was 
justified  by  inelastic  supply  of  inhabitable  land.  It  is  well  known  that  land  and  housing 
markets are more regulated in Europe than in the US. This may further hamper adjustment of 
                                                 
30 Being unemployed is more problematic for house owners in the Netherlands because after a certain period, 
they  are  forced  to  sell  their  own  house  and  live  from  the  revenue.  Therefore,  unemployment  is  much  less 
common in the owner-occupier than in the rental sector. Although house owners have a smaller risk of becoming 
unemployed, they may still need to be compensated because unemployment is an indicator of more general 
regional labour market conditions.   18 
land  and  housing  supply  to  demand  in  low-unemployment  regions,  so  that  compensating 
house price differentials are increased.
31  
Following  this  line  of  reasoning,  there  would  be  two  policy  recommendations  for 
reduction of (the persistence of) regional unemployment differentials. The first would be to 
adjust  the  benefit  level  to  the  regional  cost-of-living,  because  this  would  give  every 
unemployed person in the country the same incentive to engage in job search. The second 
recommendation would be to reduce regulation of land and housing markets, so that more 
elastic supply of inhabitable land and housing would reduce compensating differentials. 
We do acknowledge, however, that our paper does not provide sufficient theoretical 
and empirical support for such strong policy conclusions. Our agenda for future research 
would be, amongst other things, to identify the effect of regional unemployment on house 
prices  and  rents  in  a  pooled  cross-section  framework,  controlling  for  all  time-invariant 
regional heterogeneity. Ultimately, we would deal with the issues of house price differentials, 
unemployment and wages in a unified econometric framework. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3. Hedonic house price equation. 
Housing attributes  Owner-occupier  Rental 
  coeff.  std. err.  coeff.  std. err. 
Constant  4.682  0.018  5.676  0.014 
Size attributes         
Dwelling type:         
   free standing  0.491  0.013     
   semi-detached  0.265  0.013  0.102  0.009 
   cornerhouse  0.171  0.013  0.113  0.007 
   terraced house  0.116  0.013  0.104  0.006 
Number of rooms  0.077  0.001  0.073  0.002 
Garden  0.059  0.011  0.010  0.006 
Garage  0.105  0.004  0.091  0.006 
Size living room  0.065  0.001  0.049  0.001 
Size kitchen  0.020  0.001  0.007  0.001 
Quality attributes         
Central heating  0.096  0.006  0.157  0.005 
Double-glazing in living room  0.014  0.005  0.017  0.005 
Double-glazing in rest of house  0.034  0.004  0.007  0.004 
Ground floor apartment  -0.016  0.006  -0.001  0.005 
Stench/noise near dwelling  -0.004  0.004  -0.012  0.004 
Elevator available (no ground floor apartment)  0.028  0.013  0.126  0.006 
Balcony available (no ground floor apartment)  0.110  0.014  0.040  0.006 
Building period:         
   1945 – 1959   -0.015  0.006  -0.006  0.007 
   1960 – 1969  -0.030  0.006  0.095  0.006 
   1970 – 1979  -0.008  0.005  0.186  0.006 
   1980 – 1989  0.019  0.005  0.230  0.007 
   after 1989  0.110  0.006  0.285  0.008 
Regional indicators     
Regional dummies (40)  included  included 
Note: reference category of dwelling type is apartment; free-standing houses are excluded from the rental 
equation, because these houses are too scarce. 
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Table 4. Regional distribution of housing attributes. 
Housing attributes  North  West  East  South 
Size attributes         
Dwelling type:         
   free standing  0.28  0.11  0.19  0.19 
   semi-detached  0.16  0.08  0.15  0.18 
   cornerhouse  0.14  0.15  0.16  0.14 
   Terraced house  0.21  0.36  0.28  0.28 
Number of rooms  4.17  4.15  4.26  4.30 
Garden  0.82  0.75  0.83  0.82 
Garage  0.40  0.25  0.34  0.41 
Size living room  3.67  3.92  3.94  4.13 
Size kitchen  4.35  4.16  4.50  4.51 
Quality attributes         
Central heating  0.79  0.90  0.88  0.92 
Double-glazing in living room  0.86  0.85  0.84  0.82 
Double-glazing in rest of house  0.56  0.64  0.55  0.55 
Ground floor apartment  0.81  0.77  0.81  0.79 
Stench/noise near dwelling  0.25  0.30  0.27  0.30 
Elevator available (no ground floor apartment)  0.07  0.13  0.08  0.09 
Balcony available (no ground floor apartment)  0.11  0.17  0.11  0.12 
Building period:         
   1945 - 1959  0.12  0.10  0.11  0.13 
   1960 - 1969  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.17 
   1970 - 1979  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.22 
   1980 - 1989  0.14  0.18  0.18  0.18 
   after 1989  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.12 
 
 